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CRA WFORD V. MARION COUNTY ELECTION BOARD:
A PICTURE IS WORTH A THOUSAND WORDS AND
EXACTLY ONE VOTE
BRIAN C. CROOK*
There is no more fundamental right accorded to United
States citizens by the Constitution than the right to vote.
The unimpeded exercise of this right is essential to the
functioning of our democracy. Unfortunately, history
has not been kind to certain citizens in protecting their
ability to exercise this right. . . [D]isenfranchised
groups-minorities, the poor, the elderly and the
disabled-are most affected by photo ID laws.
- President Barack Obama, speaking on the Senate
floor in opposition to a voter identification requirement
(May 24, 2006).
I. INTRODUCTION
In Crawford v. Marion County Election Board,' the United
States Supreme Court upheld an Indiana statute requiring all voters to
present a form of government-issued photo identification ("ID") before
casting a ballot. Despite the various burdens the law places on people
who lack proper ID, the Court found the law to be neutral and
nondiscriminatory) Specifically, the Court determined that the State's
interests in combating voter fraud and administering fair elections
outweighed the petitioners' 4 interest in casting a ballot freely.
5
The Court made this determination notwithstanding the State's
inability to6Provide actual evidence of in-person voter fraud in the state
of Indiana. Indeed, instead of requiring the State to present concrete,
Copyright © 2010 by Brian C. Crook.
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University.
1. 128 S. Ct. 1610 (2008).
2. Id. at 1615.
3. Id. at 1624.
4. See infra Part II. The petitioners included the Indiana Democratic Party, the Marion
County Democratic Central Committee, two elected officials, and several nonprofit
organizations.
5. Crawford, 128 S. Ct. at 1623.
6. See infra Part V.A.
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particular findings of voter fraud, the Court accepted the mere
possibility of in-person voter fraud as sufficient justification to limit
access to the polls. 7 In doing so, the Court misapplied the Burdick8
balancing test, which requires a court to weigh the character and
magnitude of the burden on the voter with the "precise interests put
forward by the State as justification for the burden .. .."9 The Court
recognized the travel costs and fees necessary to obtain a federal or
state photo ID, but did not find these obstacles to be substantial. 10 As a
result, the Court seriously disenfranchised the poor, elderly, and
disabled, all of whom will be forced to overcome significant hurdles to
vote in the next Indiana election." Perhaps most importantly, the
Court also failed to adequately consider many less restrictive
alternatives that are readily available and have already been
implemented in states across the nation.12
II. THE CASE
In 2005, the Indiana legislature passed a voter ID law, Senate
Enrolled Act ("SEA") 483,13 which requires voters to present a
government-issued photo ID before casting a ballot on Election Day.
14
Following the enactment of SEA 483, the Indiana Democratic Party
and the Marion County Democratic Central Committee filed suit in the
Federal District Court for the Southern District of Indiana against the
Indiana officials responsible for the law's enforcement, 15 claiming that
the voter ID law is an unconstitutional burden on the right to vote as
7. Crawford, 128 S. Ct. at 1618-19.
8. See infra Part III.C.
9. Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 789 (1983) (emphasis added); see infra Part
V.A.
10. Crawford, 128 S. Ct. at 1623.
11. Id. at 1622-23; see infra Part V.B.
12. See infra Part V.C.
13. 2005 Ind. Acts 2005.
14. Id. SEA 483 states in relevant part:
'Proof of identification' refers to a document that satisfies all the
following: (1) The document shows the name of the individual to whom
the document was issued, and the name conforms to the name in the
individual's voter registration record. (2) The document shows a
photograph of the individual to whom the document was issued. (3) The
document includes an expiration date, and the document: (A) is not
expired; or (B) expired after the date of the most recent general election.
(4) The document was issued by the United States or the state of Indiana.
Id.
15. Ind. Democratic Party v. Rokita, 458 F. Supp. 2d 775, 782-83 (S.D. Ind. 2006).
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protected by the First' 6 and Fourteenth 7 Amendments of the U.S.
Constitution.' 8 Various civil rights organizations and politicians also
joined the suit, all of whom represented the interests of elderly,
disabled, poor, and minority voters.19 The plaintiffs and the cases were
consolidated throughout.2z
Beginning in the Federal District Court for the Southern
District of Indiana, both the plaintiffs and the State of Indiana filed
motions for summary judgment.2  The district court, applying the
Burdick standard, granted the State's motion for summary judgment on
the basis that the photo ID requirement did not impose a severe burden
22on the right to vote. The court held that there was no need to subject
the law to strict scrutiny23 and that the State of Indiana had an
important regulatory interest in combating voter fraud, which was
sufficient to justify the "reasonable, nondiscriminatory restrictions"
contained in the statute.
24
On appeal before the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit,
a divided panel affirmed the district court's decision.25 Writing for the
16. U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the
press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a
redress of grievances.").
17. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 ("No State shall ... deprive any person of life, liberty,
or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws.").
18. Rokita, 458 F. Supp. 2d at 782-84. Specifically, the plaintiffs argued that the law
"substantially burdens the fundamental right to vote, impermissibly discriminates between and
among different classes of voters, disproportionately affects disadvantaged voters, is
unconstitutionally vague, imposes a new a material requirement for voting, and was not
justified by existing circumstances or evidence." Id. at 783-84.
19. 128 S. Ct. 1610, 1614 (2008).
20. Edward B. Foley, Crawford v. Marion County Election Board: Voter ID, 5-4? If So,
So What?, 7 ELECTION LAW J. 63, 66 (2008).
21. Rokita, 458 F. Supp. 2d at 782.
22. Id. at 825.
23. Id. For an explanation of how the Supreme Court applies different levels of scrutiny
(i.e., strict scrutiny, intermediate scrutiny, and rational basis review), see Clark v. Jeter, 486
U.S. 456, 461 (1988) ("In considering whether state legislation violates the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, we apply different levels of scrutiny to different types
of classifications. At a minimum, a statutory classification must be rationally related to a
legitimate governmental purpose. Classifications based on race or national origin and
classifications affecting fundamental rights are given the most exacting scrutiny. Between
these extremes of rational basis review and strict scrutiny lies a level of intermediate scrutiny,
which generally has been applied to discriminatory classifications based on sex or
illegitimacy." (citations omitted)). For further discussion, see infra note 47 and accompanying
text.
24. Rokita, 458 F. Supp. 2d at 826 (citation omitted).
25. Crawford v. Marion County Election Bd., 472 F.3d 949, 954 (7th Cir. 2007).
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majority, Judge Richard Posner concluded that a photo ID was
26necessary to prevent voter fraud. In reaching this conclusion, the
majority rejected the argument that the law should be strictly
scrutinized, instead finding that the burden on voters was slight.
According to Judge Posner, whatever minimal burden existed was
offset by the benefit of reducing the risk of fraud.28 In a dissenting
opinion, Judge Terence Evans argued that the law should have been
struck down as an undue burden on the fundamental right to vote.
29
Following the Seventh Circuit's affirmation, the plaintiffs filed a
petition for rehearing; however, a majority of the judges voted to deny
the petition.
30
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
In a voting rights case, a court's primary task is to choose the
appropriate standard with which to measure the extent of an
individual's right to vote. Although the Supreme Court has determined
that the right to vote is a fundamental right,31 it has also concluded that
states may regulate and restrict access to the polls in order to
administer fair and legitimate elections.3 2 In Crawford, the Court
chose to apply the Burdick balancing standard to resolve the
competing interests, an approach that weighs the character and
magnitude of the asserted injury against a state's justifications for the
injury imposed.33
26. Id. at 953.
27. Id. at 952.
28. Id. at 952-53.
29. Id. at 954 (Evans, J., dissenting). Judge Evans opened his opinion this way:
Let's not beat around the bush: The Indiana voter photo ID law is a not-
too-thinly-veiled attempt to discourage election-day turnout by certain
folks believed to skew Democratic. We should subject this law to strict
scrutiny-or at least... something akin to 'strict scrutiny light'-and strike
it down as an undue burden on the fundamental right to vote. Id.
30. Crawford v. Marion County Election Bd., 484 F.3d 436, 437 (7th Cir. 2007).
31. See infra Part III.A.
32. See infra Part III.B.
33. See infra Part III.C.
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A. The Right to Vote as a Fundamental Right
The Supreme Court has long recognized that the right to vote is
a fundamental right under the Equal Protection Clause 3z of the U.S.
Constitution.35 As early as 1886, in Yick Wo v. Hopkins,36 the Court
described the "political franchise of voting" as a "fundamental
political right, because [it is] preservative of all rights."37 Nearly
eighty years later, in 1964, Chief Justice Earl Warren reiterated this
notion in Reynolds v. Sims:
38
Undoubtedly, the right of suffrage is a fundamental
matter in a free and democratic society. Especially
since the right to exercise the franchise in a free and
unimpaired manner is preservative of other basic civil
and political rights, any alleged infringement of the
right of citizens to vote must be carefully and
meticulously scrutinized.39
The Court added in Reynolds that "[t]he right to vote freely for
the candidate of one's choice is of the essence of a democratic society,
and restrictions on that right strike at the heart of representative
government., 40 Similarly, the right to vote has been addressed in many
of the Amendments to the Constitution, which together have expanded
the right to vote to virtually all adult citizens.
41
34. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment to the U. S. Constitution provides that "[n]o state shall.., deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.").
35. See, e.g., Kramer v. Union Free Sch. Dist., 395 U.S. 621, 626 (1969); Harper v. Va.
State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 667 (1966); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 555 (1964).
36. 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
37. Id. at 370.
38. Reynolds, 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
39. Id. at 561-62 (Warren, C.J.).
40. Id. at 555.
41. U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 1 (The Fifteenth Amendment forbids discrimination in
the context of voting on the basis "of race, color, or previous condition of servitude."); U.S.
CONST. amend. XIX (The Nineteenth Amendment forbids discrimination in the context of
voting "on account of sex."); U.S. CONST. amend. XXIV, § 1 (The Twenty-fourth Amendment
prohibits "any poll tax" on persons before they can vote); U.S. CONST. amend. XXVI, § 1 (The
Twenty-sixth Amendment grants the right to vote to all citizens over the age of eighteen).
2009]
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B. Determining the Standard with which to Analyze an Individual's
Right to Vote
It was not until Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections42 in 1966
that the Court first announced a fixed standard to determine whether a
qualification on the right to vote would be deemed constitutional.43 In
Harper, the Court struck down a Virginia statute that required voters
to pay a poll tax of $1.50. 44 The Court concluded that a state violates
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment whenever
"it makes the affluence of the voter or payment of any fee an electoral
standard. 4 5 The Court added: "To introduce wealth or payment of a
fee as a measure of a voter's qualifications is to introduce ...
invidious discrimination that runs afoul of the Equal Protection
Clause.
4 6
The Harper Court, however, did not base its decision on a
specific level of scrutiny.47 It was not until three years later, in Kramer
v. Union Free School District,48 that the Court made it clear that an
exacting standard was necessary to protect the right to vote. 49 In
Kramer, a bachelor who lived with his parents challenged a New York
law which stated that voters for school district elections must own
taxable property in the district or be parents of one or more children
enrolled in the school district.5 ° The Court applied strict scrutiny to
42. 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
43. Id. at 670.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 666. In addition, the Court noted that "[v]oter qualifications [should] have no
relation to wealth" and that "lines may not be drawn which are inconsistent with the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment." Id. at 665-66.
46. Id. at 668 (citation omitted).
47. As discussed earlier (see supra note 23), the Supreme Court has constructed three
levels of scrutiny to determine whether a State law is valid under the Equal Protection Clause.
The general rule is that legislation is presumed to be valid if the classification drawn by the
statute is rationally related to a legitimate state interest. Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center,
473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985). This general rule explains the first, low level of scrutiny-the
rational basis test-and it offers states wide latitude in legislating (usually social or economic)
issues. The second level of scrutiny is referred to as intermediate scrutiny. Id. A court will use
intermediate scrutiny if a law categorizes on the basis of gender. Id. In such a case, the law is
unconstitutional unless it is substantially related to an important government interest. Id.
Finally, under strict scrutiny, the toughest of the three levels of scrutiny, a law is
unconstitutional if it categorizes on the basis of a "suspect class" like race or national origin,
or infringes a fundamental right, unless the law is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling
government interest. Id. Under strict scrutiny, a state law is almost always struck down as
unconstitutional.
48. 395 U.S. 621 (1969).
49. Id. at 626.
50. Id. at 623-24.
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invalidate the law and found that it was not narrowly tailored to serve
the State's interest.51 The Kramer Court held that limitations on voting
are subject to "exacting judicial scrutiny ' 52 and must "further a
compelling state interest.,
53
Unfortunately, the Kramer Court's strict reinterpretation of the
Harper standard created tension with the states' constitutionally
protected responsibility to administer elections. 54  Although an
individual's right to vote usually invokes the greatest of constitutional
protections, states also have an interest in conducting legitimate
elections. This state interest invariably impedes an individual's right to
55 56vote. For example, in Marston v. Lewis the Court upheld an
Arizona law that involved a fifty-day durational residency
requirement.57 The majority agreed with the State's argument that the
law, which required voters to reside in the state for at least fifty days,
was an "amply justifiable legislative judgment ... necessary to
promote the State's important interest in accurate voter lists." 8 In
reaching this conclusion, the Court never addressed which level of
scrutiny it used to make its decision.59 It is clear, however, that the
Court did not use strict scrutiny since it did not analyze whether the
law was narrowly tailored to serve a governmental interest. The
Marston standard was noticeably more relaxed than the Harper
standard. In fact, the Court's deference to the legislature's judgment
was most consistent with the rational basis test.
60
51. Id. at 632-33.
52. Id. at 628.
53. Id. at 633.
54. Not only does state sovereignty require that state elections be governed by state law,
but Article I, Section 4 of the U.S. Constitution grants mutual authority to the federal
government and the states to administer federal elections: "The Times, Places and Manner of
holding Elections for Senators and Representatives shall be prescribed in each State by the
Legislature thereof; but the Congress may at any time by Law make or alter such Regulations,
except as to the Places of chusing Senators." As a result, the Court has recognized that States
retain the power to regulate their own elections. See e.g., Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634,
647 (1973); Tashjian v. Republican Party of Conn., 479 U.S. 208, 217 (1986).
55. See Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 730 (1974) ("[A]s a practical matter, there must
be a substantial regulation of elections if they are to be fair and honest and if some sort of
order, rather than chaos, is to accompany the democratic processes.").
56. 410 U.S. 679 (1973).
57. Id. at 679-80.
58. Id. at 681.
59. Id.
60. Id. The Court exercised a level of scrutiny close to rational basis by accepting the
fifty-day residency requirement. The Court stated that the requirement was "tied to the closing
of the State's registration process at 50 days prior to elections and reflects a state legislative
judgment that the period is necessary to achieve the State's legitimate goals." Id. at 680.
2009] 379
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C. The Burdick Balancing Approach
As a result of these conflicting standards, for two decades the
Court alternated between a strict scrutiny standard and a lower, more
deferential standard resembling the rational basis test. The Court
finally addressed this conflict in Anderson v. Celebrezze.62 In
Anderson, the Court discussed the inevitable burdens placed on
individual voters when a state attempts to administer a fair election:
"[W]hether it governs the registration and qualifications of voters, the
selection and eligibility of candidates, or the voting process itself, [an
election code] inevitably affects-at least to some degree-the
individual's right to vote . ,,63 Recognizing that states need some
degree of latitude in administering fair elections, the Anderson Court
rejected the argument that every voting regulation needs to be strictly
scrutinized; instead, the Court created a more flexible, balancing
approach.64 The new balancing approach weighed a state's interest in
administering fair elections with the burdens placed on a group of
voters. 65 Under this approach, the Court no longer needed to adopt a
specific level of scrutiny when analyzing an election law; as stated in
Anderson, a state's election laws "cannot be resolved by any 'litmus-
paper test' that will separate valid from invalid restrictions."
66
Finally, in Burdick v. Takushi,67 nine years after the Court's
decision in Anderson, the Court reformulated its balancing approach
into the standard used today when analyzing the constitutionality of a
state election law:
A court considering a challenge to a state election law
must weigh "the character and magnitude of the
asserted injury to the rights protected by the First and
Fourteenth Amendment that the plaintiff seeks to
vindicate" against "the precise interests put forward by
61. Compare City of Phoenix v. Kolodziejski, 399 U.S. 204, 205, 213 (1970) (applying
a heightened level of scrutiny under Kramer to strike down the law because the Court had not
"been shown that the 14 States now restricting the franchise have unique problems that make
it necessary to limit the vote to property owners") with Holt Civic Club v. City of Tuscaloosa,
439 U.S. 60, 68-70 (1978) (applying a more deferential standard in holding that because
plaintiffs resided within police jurisdiction of Tuscaloosa but outside city limits, the law only
needed to "bear some rational relationship to a legitimate state purpose").
62. 460 U.S. 780 (1983).
63. Id. at 788.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 789.
66. Id.
67. 504 U.S. 428 (1992).
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the State as justifications for the burden imposed by its
rule," taking into consideration "the extent to which
those interests make it necessary to burden the
plaintiff's rights."68
The Burdick Court emphasized that although voting rights are
fundamental, not all restrictions limiting access to the polls should be
deemed unconstitutional.69 Only when voting rights are subjected to
severe restrictions should the regulation be "narrowly drawn to
advance a state interest of compelling importance." 70 On the other
hand, if the regulation imposes only "reasonable, nondiscriminatory
restrictions" upon those rights, then the State's important regulatory
interests are generally sufficient to justify the restrictions.7 1 In other
words, the Burdick standard allows courts to weigh the law's burden
on voters with the importance of the state interest at stake: If the
burden is great and the state interest only slight, then the law will most
likely be struck down;72 however, if the burden is light and the state
interest weighty, then the law will most likely be upheld. 3
68. Id. at 434 (quoting Anderson, 460 U.S. at 789 (1983)). Although this balancing test
was originally created by the Anderson court, because the Burdick Court clarified and
expounded upon the test, today, the balancing test is referred to as the Burdick balancing test.
69. Id.
70. Id. (quoting Norman v. Reed, 502 U.S. 279, 289 (1992)). Unfortunately, the
Supreme Court has not been very explicit in determining when an election law imposes a
severe burden on the right to vote. As a result, courts tend to differ on what qualifies as
"severe," instead resorting to "judicial 'eyeballing.' to determine the severity of election laws.
Muhammad At-Tauhidi, Access v. Integrity: Determining the Constitutionality of Voter ID
Laws Under Anderson v. Celebrezze, 17 Temp. Pol. & Civ. Rts. L. Rev. 215, 233 (2007).
71. Burdick, 504 U.S. at 434 (quoting Anderson, 460 U.S. at 788 (1983)).
72. For examples of cases determining the burden to be "severe," see Common
Cause/Georgia v. Billups, 439 F.Supp. 2d 1294 (N.D. Ga. 2006) (holding that the law
presented a severe restriction on the right to vote based primarily on the large number of
registered Georgia voters who did not already have a government-issued photo ID);
Weinschenk v. State, 203 S.W.3d 201 (Mo. 2006) (en banc) (finding that forcing ID holders to
pay the fees associated with getting a state ID placed severe burdens on the right to vote and
thus the law would be subjected to strict scrutiny).
73. Burdick, 504 U.S. at 434. For examples of state courts applying the Burdick test and
determining the burden to be not "severe," see Colorado Common Cause v. Davidson, No.
04CV7709, 2004 WL 2360485, at *12 (D. Colo. Oct. 18, 2004) (holding that the law was
unlikely to constitute a "severe" intrusion on voting rights because so many forms of photo
and non-photo ID were accepted); League of Women Voters v. Blackwell, 340 F. Supp. 2d
823 (N.D. Ohio 2004) (the Ohio court found that the voter ID law was not "severe," and thus
unlikely to affect the small number of voters who (a) were voting for the first time, (b) had
registered by mail, and (c) could neither produce one of the numerous forms of acceptable
documentary proof nor orally provide a social security number).
2009]
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IV. THE COURT'S REASONING
The plurality in Crawford affirmed the Seventh Circuit's ruling
that the evidence in the record was insufficient to support a broad
attack on the validity of SEA 483. 74 To justify this conclusion, Justice
John Paul Stevens, writing for the plurality, endorsed the Burdick test,
which requires a court to weigh the asserted injury to the right to vote
against the "precise interests put forward by the State as justifications
for the burden imposed by its rule. 75 Justice Stevens rejected a rigid
litmus test for measuring the severity of the burden but instead
endorsed the flexible standard affirmed in Burdick.76 As interpreted by
Justice Stevens, the Burdick test demands that even a slight burden on
voting rights must "be justified by relevant and legitimate state
interests 'sufficiently weighty to justify the limitation. ,7f
The plurality recognized four relevant state interests that could
justify the burden placed on the right to vote: 1) the need to modernize
elections; 2) the need to protect against voter fraud; 3) the need to
address bloated voter rolls; and 4) the need to protect voter confidence
in the electoral process. 78 Given these four state interests, the Court
refused to accept the petitioners' facial attack on SEA 483.79
The Crawford Court first addressed the State's interest in
modernizing election procedures. The Court recognized that two
recently enacted federal statutes, the National Voter Registration Act
of 1993 (NVRA) and the Help America Vote Act of 2002 (HAVA),
both contain provisions that allow photo ID to be used in establishing a
voter's qualifications. 80 Moreover, HAVA requires that every state
maintain a computerized database of all registered voters. According
74. Crawford v. Marion County Election Bd., 128 S. Ct. 1610, 1615 (2008).
75. Id. at 1616.
76. Id. There is debate among the Justices as to whether the Burdick test did anything
more than affirm the balancing standard as laid out in Anderson v. Celebrezze. Whereas the
plurality in Crawford believes that Burdick effectively adopted the Anderson balancing test at
face value, Justice Antonin Scalia insists that the Burdick Court "forged Anderson's
amorphous 'flexible standard' into something resembling an administrable rule." Id. at 1624
(Scalia, J., concurring). According to Justice Scalia, the Burdick standard creates a two-tiered
analysis. Id. First, a court must ask if the burden has a severe impact on voters generally. Id. If
the burden is severe on the majority of voters, then a court should apply strict scrutiny. Id. at
1625. If the burden is generally non-severe and nondiscriminatory, then the Burdick standard
becomes deferential to "important regulatory interests." Id. In other words, it is Justice
Scalia's view that the Burdick standard informs, rather than replaces, the levels of scrutiny.
77. Id. (quoting Norman, 502 U.S. at 288-89 (1992)).
78. Id. at 1616-20.
79. Id. at 1624.
80. Id. at 1617-18.
81. Id. at 1617.
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to the plurality, Congress's attempt to modernize elections through
HAVA conveys an additional intent to stamp out voter fraud with
more definite ID requirements. 82 The Commission on Federal Election
Reform confirmed the plurality's stance, stating that "[p]hoto
identification cards currently are needed to board a plane, enter federal
buildings, and cash a check. Voting is equally important."
83
Second, the Court discussed the importance of preventing voter
fraud. Although the record did not contain any evidence of actual in-
person voter fraud in Indiana,84 the Court nevertheless maintained that
the mere possibility of voter fraud creates a legitimate state interest. 85
The Court stated that "[w]hile the most effective method of preventing
election fraud may well be debatable, the propriety of doing so is
perfectly clear. '86
Third, Justice Stevens accepted the State's argument that SEA
483 deals with the inflated voter roll problem effectively. 87 To support
this proposition, the Court referred to a newspaper article that
described Indiana's bloated voter rolls; the article stated that the rolls
include names of persons "who had either moved, died or were not
eligible to vote because they had been convicted of felonies." 88 The
Court reinforced this position by noting the unusually large number of
lawsuits brought in Indiana by the Federal Government alleging
violations of NVRA.8 9 The Court concluded that, despite the fact that
the inaccurate inflation of registration lists was probably due to
Indiana's own negligence, the inflated voter roll problem nevertheless
provided a "neutral and nondiscriminatory reason supporting the
State's decision to require photo ID." 90
Finally, the Court recognized a fourth State interest justifying
the use of photo ID for the purpose of voter registration: the State's
interest in protecting public confidence in the democratic process.
Although, as the Court noted, this interest is intimately related to the
State's interest in preventing voter fraud, the Court considered this
82. Id. at 1618.
83. Id. (quoting AMERICAN UNIVERSITY, COMMISSION ON FEDERAL ELECTION REFORM,
REPORT: BUILDING CONFIDENCE IN U.S. ELECTIONS § 2.5, APp. 136-37 (CARTER-BAKER
REPORT)) [hereinafter CARTER-BAKER REPORT].
84. Crawford, 128 S. Ct. at 1619. SEA 483 addresses only "in-person voter
impersonation at polling places." Id. at 1618-19.
85. Id. at 1619.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 1619-20.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 1620.
90. Id.
2009]
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interest separately because of its independent effect on participation in
representative government.
91
After discussing the various state interests associated with a
photo ID requirement, the Court addressed the possible burdens that
could be placed on potential Indiana voters. 92 The Court first
dismissed the burdens associated with losing one's ID card or perhaps
looking different from the picture in the photo ID.93 Instead, the Court
stated that the relevant burdens are those imposed on eligible voters
who do not currently possess a valid photo ID under the requirements
of SEA 483. 94 With regard to this subset of voters, the Court
concluded that "the inconvenience of making a trip to the [Indiana
Bureau of Motor Vehicles], gathering the required documents, and
posing for a photograph surely does not qualify as a substantial burden
on the right to vote .... ,,95
In addition, the Court noted that Indiana, like many other
states, provides free voter registration cards. Yet, the Court also noted
that one can obtain a "free" ID card only by presenting at least one
"primary" document. 96 Most likely, this "primary" document will be a
birth certificate, a copy of which can cost anywhere from three dollars
to twelve dollars. 97 Despite the fact that the Court mentioned
specifically that "a tax or a fee to obtain a new photo identification"
would not "save the statute under our reasoning," the Court did not
equate the fee necessary to obtain a birth certificate with the fee
necessary to obtain new photo ID.9 s Thus, the Court concluded that a
photo ID requirement does not place a significant burden on the
average Indiana voter.
99
The Court did admit that the statute may place a heavier burden
on a limited number of persons: in particular, the elderly from out-of-
state and the poor, who may find it difficult to obtain a birth
certificate; the homeless; and people with a religious objection to
being photographed.' 00 The Court responded to the burdens placed on
these particular persons by noting that "voters without photo
identification may cast provisional ballots that will ultimately be
91. Id.
92. Id. at 1620-21.
93. Id. at 1620.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 1621.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 1620-21.
99. Id. at 1621.
100. Id.
A PICTURE IS WORTH A THOUSAND WORDS
counted."10' The Court pointed out that these voters would have to
travel to the circuit court clerk's office within ten days to sign an
affidavit, but the Court concluded that this additional burden did not
pose a constitutional problem'
0 2
Justice Stevens concluded the plurality opinion by noting that
the petitioners did not provide any "concrete evidence of the burden
imposed on voters who currently lack photo identification."10 3 More
importantly, the plurality maintained, the record does not contain any
reliable data "about the difficulties faced by either indigent voters or
voters with religious objections to being photographed." Given that
the lawsuit concerned a broad attack on the constitutionality of SEA
483, which, if successful, would invalidate the statute in its entirety,
the Court concluded that the petitioners' claim must fail. 10 5 Ultimately,
the plurality concluded that the statute did not impose "excessively
burdensome requirements on any class of voters"'; therefore, SEA 483
could not be deemed invalid.'0 6
In a concurring opinion, joined by Justice Thomas and Justice
Alito, Justice Scalia maintained that the petitioners' premise that SEA
483 may impose a special burden on some voters is irrelevant, since
the law's overall burden is "minimal and justified."'1 7 He agreed that
the Court should follow the approach set out in Burdick v. Takushi, but
he did not interpret the Burdick test to be a mere balancing approach.
Instead, Justice Scalia stated that the Burdick test involves a
"deferential 'important regulatory interests' standard for benign,
nondiscriminatory restrictions, reserving strict scrutiny for laws that
severely restrict the right to vote."'10 8 In other words, under Scalia's
view, whether an election law is valid depends first and foremost on
the severity of the burden on the voter.'0 9 If the burden is severe, then
strict scrutiny ought to be applied and the law must be narrowly
tailored to serve a compelling government interest." 0 If the burden is
ordinary and widespread and thus benign, then the Court should apply
a deferential standard that will most likely grant validity to the statute
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 1622.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 1621.
106. Id. at 1623 (citing Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 738 (1974)).
107. Id. at 1624 (Scalia, J., concurring).
108. Id.; accord Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 433-34 (1992).
109. Id. at 1624.
110. Id.
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at issue."11 Unlike Justice Stevens' view that slight burdens still need
to be justified by legitimate state interests under a flexible balancing
standard, Justice Scalia argued that an election law that places a
minimal burden on a small number of people should be granted
deferential treatment and need not be overturned. 112 Using this
approach, Justice Scalia concluded that the burdens were not severe,
and that the State's interests were "sufficient to sustain that minimal
burden."' 13 With Justice Scalia, Thomas and Alito joining the plurality
opinion, Indiana's SEA 483 was held to be valid by a 6-3 vote. 
14
Justice Souter, in a dissenting opinion joined by Justice
Ginsburg, maintained that the statute was unconstitutional under the
Burdick balancing test." 5 Quoting from Burdick, Justice Souter stated
that "a State may not burden the right to vote merely by invoking
abstract interests, be they legitimate, or even compelling, but must
make a particular, factual showing that threats to its interests outweigh
the particular impediments it has imposed."'1 16 Like the plurality,
Justice Souter agreed that Burdick set up a balancing test to replace the
rigid analysis under the three levels of scrutiny.1 7 However, under the
Burdick balancing test, Justice Souter believed that the plurality
inadequately assessed the magnitude of the burden placed on voters in
Indiana. 11
8
Justice Souter outlined four distinct burdens that the Indiana
law imposes on likely voters: 1) the travel costs and fees necessary to
obtain a valid form of photo ID; 2) the unduly burdensome provisional
ballot system that requires voters to travel long distances to their
circuit court clerk's office; 3) the likely affect that the law will have on
approximately 43,000 voting age residents that lack proper photo ID;
and 4) the fact that compared to other states that effectively administer
fair election procedures, the law-as the most restrictive voting
requirement in the country-unnecessarily retards the right to vote. I
9
Given these diverse burdens, Justice Souter maintained that SEA 483
111. Id.
112. Id. at 1627.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 1624.
115. Id. at 1627 (Souter, J., dissenting).
116. Id.
117. Id. at 1628 ("Given the legitimacy of interests on both sides, we have avoided pre-
set levels of scrutiny in favor of a sliding-scale balancing analysis: the scrutiny varies with the
effect of the regulation at issue.").
118. Id.
119. Id. at 1628-35.
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places "nontrivial burdens" on the voting rights of tens of thousands of
Indiana citizens.'
20
Justice Souter then proceeded to take a closer look at the
State's claimed interests as discussed in the lead opinion.
2 1
Addressing each of the four interests individually-the need to
modernize election procedures; the need to combat voter fraud; the
need to address bloated voter rolls; and the need to protect voter
confidence in the integrity of the electoral process-Justice Souter
concluded that the State's interests did not justify the unnecessary
restriction on voting.122 He emphasized that the State proffered "no
evidence of in-person voter impersonation fraud in a State, and very
little of it nationwide ..." 123 Justice Souter concluded that the Indiana
Voter ID Law was unconstitutional: "the state interests fail to justify
the practical limitations placed on the right to vote, and the law
imposes an unreasonable and irrelevant burden on voters who are poor
and old."
124
Justice Breyer also wrote a dissenting opinion, noting that the
Court failed to adequately consider alternative methods of registration
that are superior to Indiana's current law. 125 To support this position,
Justice Breyer quoted the Carter-Baker Commission, 126 an extensive
report on federal election reform, consisting of eighty-seven
recommendations to help improve future elections.1 27 The report
conditioned its recommendations upon "the States' willingness to
ensure that the requisite photo IDs 'be easily available and issued free
of charge' and that the requirement be 'phased in' over two federal
election cycles, to ease the transition." 128 Justice Breyer contrasted
Indiana's system to the systems in Florida and Georgia, two states that
have implemented photo ID requirements far less restrictive than
Indiana's.1 29 As a result, Justice Breyer concluded that Indiana's law
120. Id. at 1627.
121. Id. at 1635-43.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 1642. Justice Souter continued: "Without a shred of evidence that in-person
voter impersonation is a problem in the State, much less a crisis, Indiana has adopted one of
the most restrictive photo identification requirements in the country." Id.
124. Id. at 1643.
125. Id. at 1643-45 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
126. CARTER-BAKER REPORT, supra note 83.
127. Id.
128. Crawford, 128 S. Ct. at 1644 (quoting CARTER-BAKER REPORT, supra note 83, at
App. 139, 140).
129. Id.
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placed a disproportionate burden on those voters without valid photo
IDs. 13
0
V. ANALYSIS
The Court addressed the petioners' voting-rights claim by
applying the appropriate Burdick balancing standard, but the Court
gave too much weight to the State's vague allegations of fraud.
131
Additionally, the plurality failed to adequately account for the
disproportionate effect that the statute will have on the poor, elderly
and disabled. 132 In doing so, the plurality ignored many other voting
systems around the nation that provide the same protection against
fraud without the disparate impact on the poor and disadvantaged. 1
33
A. The Court Misapplied the Burdick Balancing Test
In holding Indiana's voter ID law to be valid, the Court
correctly used the Burdick balancing test but inappropriately applied
the test to the facts at hand.' 34 This test, as stated earlier, requires the
Court to weigh the character and magnitude of the voting restriction
against the "precise interests put forward by the State as justifications
for the burden imposed by its rule."' 135 As Justice Souter said in his
dissent, the State may not burden the right to vote "merely by invoking
abstract interests," but must make particular factual showings that its
interest in administering a fair election outweighs the voter's interest
in freely accessing the polls.' 36 The State, then, has an initial burden to
offer concrete evidence in support of its restrictive voting law.'
37
The State imposed its voter ID law primarily to prevent voter
fraud. 138 As stated in the Supreme Court case Purcell v. Gonzalez
39
"[v]oter fraud drives honest citizens out of the democratic process and
breeds distrust of our government."'140 However, a distinction must be
made between voter fraud generally and the specific type of voter
130. Id. at 1645.
131. See infra Part V.A.
132. See infra Part V.B.
133. See infra Part V.C.
134. Crawford, 128 S. Ct. at 1616.
135. Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 789 (1983) (emphasis added).
136. Crawford, 128 S. Ct. at 1627 (Souter, J., dissenting).
137. Id.
138. Id. at 1617.
139. 549 U.S. 1 (2006).
140. Id. at4.
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fraud that a photo ID will help to prevent. As the plurality opinion
admits, the only type of voter fraud that Indiana's statute addresses is
in-person voter impersonation at the polling places. 141 Of all the
various forms of voter fraud that exist, voter ID laws have no effect on
most forms, including "vote buying, double voting, ballot box stuffing,
or voting by convicted felons."' 4 Fully aware of the limited impact
that the law could have on preventing in-person voter fraud, the
plurality made a striking, and frightfully blunt confession: "The record
contains no evidence of any such [in-person] fraud actually occurring
in Indiana at any time in its history. 04'No evidence of in-person voter
fraud whatsoever in Indiana. Instead, the State relies on out-of-state
newspaper reports of multiple voting and general instances of fraud as
its "empirical proof' of voter fraud. 44 Granted, petitioners too, failed
to present concrete data on the number of likely voters to be deterred
from voting as a result of the new photo ID law, but such precise
empirical data has never been required for a plaintiff to prevail on a
voting-rights claim.145 There is no doubt that such data would aid the
141. Crawford, 128 S. Ct. at 1618-19. In other words, this law will only attack those
people who attempt to show up at the polls to cast a vote for someone else, which is no easy
task. Not only must the impersonator be certain that the other person has not already voted, but
he must also be certain that the other person is registered in that particular precinct.
142. At-Tauhidi, supra note 70, at 245; see also BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, ANALYSIS
OF ELIGIBLE VOTERS POTENTIALLY BARRED FROM THE POLLS BY RESTRICTIVE NEW ID
REQUIREMENTS IN MISSOURI SENATE BILLS Nos. 1014 & 730, available at
http://www.brennancenter.org/page/-/d/download file_10172.pdf ("The report identified 114
alleged votes by convicted felons (not solved by photo ID); seventy-nine voters allegedly
registered with vacant-lot addresses (not solved by photo ID); forty-five people who allegedly
voted twice (not solved by photo ID); and fourteen votes allegedly by deceased persons
(potentially solved by photo ID, but also solved by HAVA's new database provisions). Even if
these allegations proved true -and several were debunked upon further investigation-at most
0.0 1% of these identified problems might have been prevented by photo ID requirements.").
143. Crawford, 128 S. Ct. at 1619.
144. See id. at 1619-20. "The lack of evidence of in-person voter impersonation fraud is
not for failure to search." Id. at 1637 n.28 (Souter, J., dissenting). See, e.g., Eric Lipton & Ian
Urbina, In 5-Year Effort, Scant Evidence of Voter Fraud, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 12, 2007, at Al
("Five years after the Bush Administration began a crackdown on voter fraud, the Justice
Department has turned up virtually no evidence of any organized effort to skew federal
elections, according to court records and interviews.").
145. Crawford, 128 S. Ct. at 1634 (Souter, J., dissenting); see also Washington State
Grange v. Washington State Republican Party, 128 S. Ct. 1184, 1197 (2008) (Roberts, C. J.,
concurring) ("Nothing in my analysis requires the parties to produce studies regarding voter
perceptions on this score ...."); Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 335 n. 5 (1972) ("[I]t
would be difficult to determine precisely how many would-be voters throughout the country
cannot vote because of durational residence requirements ...."); Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S.
134, 144 (1972) (taking account of "the obvious likelihood" that candidate filing fees "would
fall more heavily on the less affluent segment of the community, whose favorites may be
unable to pay the large costs ....").
390 U. MD. L.J. RACE, RELIGION, GENDER & CLASS [VOL. 9:373
plaintiffs in making their case, but they do not carry such a weighty
burden. 1
46
Given the dearth of evidence on voter fraud, one would assume
that the State used this justification as one of its minor points to defend
its voter ID statute, but instead the State used the possibility of voter
fraud as its primary argument. 147 The three other reasons that the State
offered in support of its voter ID law-modernizing election
procedures, addressing the consequences of the State's bloated voter
rolls, and protecting public confidence in the integrity of the electoral
process-are all abstract, non-particular interests that are only scarcely
related to the protections afforded by a voter ID law. 148 Although
inaccurate registration lists are cause for very real concern, the
problem usually arises when local authorities fail to account for voters
who have died or moved away, not because of any form of fraudulent
conspiracy. 1
49
As a result, the Court misapplied the Burdick balancing test.
Because voting is arguably a fundamental right, and because the State
failed to present any concrete factual evidence to justify the overly-
restrictive voter ID law, the statute should have been struck down as
unconstitutional.
B. The Statute is Unduly Burdensome on the Poor, Disabled and
Elderly
The plurality opinion openly admits that if Indiana required
voters to pay a fee for their voter ID cards, then this would be an
unconstitutional restriction on the right to vote.1 50 In this case, the
plurality is satisfied with Indiana's voter ID law because the photo ID
cards are offered to citizens free of charge. 5' However, this is not the
full story. In order to obtain a "free" voter ID card, "a person must
present at least one 'primary' document, which can be a birth
certificate, certificate of naturalization, U.S. veterans photo
identification, U.S. military photo identification, or a U.S. passport."'
' 52
146. Crawford, 128 S. Ct. at 1634 (Souter, J., dissenting).
147. Id. at 1617 (plurality opinion).
148. Id.; see also At-Tauhidi, supra note 70, at 245-46.
149. See At-Tauhidi, supra note 70, at 245.
150. Crawford, 128 S. Ct. at 1620-21. The statute would be unconstitutional under
Harper v. Virginia State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 666 (1966) (holding Virginia's poll
tax unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment).
Crawford, 128 S. Ct. at 1620-21.
151. Id. at 1621.
152. Id. at 1621 n.17 (quoting Ind. Admin. Code, tit. 140, § 7-4-3 (2008)).
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Unfortunately, one cannot obtain any of these documents without
paying a fee.' 53 In order to obtain a birth certificate in Indiana, one
must pay between $3 and $12.154 The total fees for a passport are
upwards of $100.155 In the end, if an Indiana resident wants to vote in
the next election, she must either have a valid photo ID or she will
need to spend at least $3.
The reality, however, is that people without a photo ID will
need to spend quite a bit more than $3 in order to vote in the next
Indiana election. On top of the $3 fee that is needed to obtain a birth
certificate, there are travel costs associated with visiting a branch of
the Indiana Bureau of Motor Vehicles (BMV). This extra burden may
seem trivial, and in fact, probably is trivial for the vast majority of
voters. But for the poor, elderly, and disabled voters who do not drive
a car, the burden will prove to be especially prohibitive. 56 In fact, the
voters who lack proper photo ID are probably the same poor, elderly
and disabled voters who will find the travel to be disproportionately
burdensome. 157 Many of these people will not own cars, and the public
transportation in Indiana is limited. 158 Without easy access to the BMV
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 1631 (Souter, J., dissenting).
156. Id. at 1629. For a comparable study done in Missouri, see BRENNAN CTR. FOR
JUSTICE supra, note 142 ("The impact of this photo ID requirement is even greater for the
elderly ...people with disabilities, low-income individuals, and people of color. At least
eleven percent of Missouri seniors do not have a current driver's license. Almost twelve
percent of Missouri residents live below the poverty line, and are less likely to own an
automobile; moreover, African-American Missourians are more than twice as likely as whites
to be poor. More than twenty-one percent of Missouri's African-American households-more
than four times the rate of white households-have no car, and therefore little need for a
driver's license.") (internal citations omitted); see also Crawford, 128 S. Ct. at 1634 n.25
("Studies in other States suggest that the burdens of an ID requirement may also fall
disproportionately upon racial minorities."); Spencer Overton, Voter Identification, 105 MICH.
L. REV. 631, 659 (2007) ("In 1994, the U. S. Department of Justice found that African-
Americans in Louisiana were four to five times less likely than white residents to have
government-sanctioned photo identification"); id. at 659-60 (describing June 2005 study by
the Employment and Training Institute at the University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, which
found that while seventeen percent of voting-age whites lacked a valid driver's license, fifty-
five percent of black males and forty-nine percent of black females were unlicensed, and
forty-six percent of Latino males and fifty-nine percent of Latino females were similarly
unlicensed).
157. Crawford, 128 S. Ct. at 1630 (Souter, J., dissenting); see also Crawford, 472 F.3d
949, 951 (7th Cir. 2007) ("No doubt most people who don't have photo ID are low on the
economic ladder"); cf Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134, 144 (1972) ("[W]e would ignore
reality were we not to recognize that this system falls with unequal weight on voters ...
according to their economic status.").
158. Crawford, 128 S. Ct. at 1630 (Souter, J., dissenting) ("According to a report
published by Indiana's Department of Transportation in August 2007, 21 of Indiana's 92
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stations, many of these disadvantaged voters will see the various costs
associated with obtaining a voter ID as simply too hefty to justify
participating on Election Day.
To counter many of these worthy arguments, the state of
Indiana points to its provisional ballot system as an adequate
supplement for those who find it difficult to obtain a photo ID.
159
Indiana's provisional-ballot system grants an exception to the ID
requirement "for individuals the State considers 'indigent."" 6' The
exception allows voters who show up to the polls without ID to cast a
provisional ballot. 161 This sounds easy enough, but unfortunately,
casting a provisional ballot requires a great deal of additional work. 1
62
To have the provisional ballot counted, a voter must show up in person
before the circuit court within ten days after the election. 163 Unlike the
trip to the BMV (which only needs to be made once every four years
for renewal of non-driver photo ID), this trip must be taken every time
an indigent person wishes to vote since the State does not allow an
affidavit to count in successive elections. 164 And unlike the trip to the
BMV (which can have multiple branches per county), a county has
only one county seat.' 65 Again, this puts a disproportionate burden on
those voters who may find it hard to travel, particularly the poor,
elderly and disabled. 1 6 Certainly, the provisional ballot system does
not come close to compensating those persons without a valid photo
ID.
16 7
counties have no public transportation system at all, and as of 2000, nearly 1 in every 10
voters lived within 1 of these 21 counties.").
159. Id. at 1631.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 1631-32.
165. Id. at 1632.
166. Id. "That the need to travel to the county seat each election amounts to a high hurdle
is shown in the results of the 2007 municipal elections in Marion County, to which Indiana's
Voter ID Law applied. Thirty-four provisional ballots were cast, but only two provisional
voters made it to the County Clerk's Office within the ten days. All thirty-four of these
aspiring voters appeared at the appropriate precinct; thirty-three of them provided a signature,
and every signature matched the one on file; and twenty-six of the thirty-two voters whose
ballots were not counted had a history of voting in Marion County elections." Id.
167. Id. "And even if that were not so, the provisional-ballot option would be inadequate
for a further reason: the indigency exception by definition offers no relief to those voters who
do not consider themselves (or would not be considered) indigent but as a practical matter
would find it hard, for nonfinancial reasons, to get the required ID (most obviously the
disabled)." Id.
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C. Alternative Methods
When a given state places a serious restriction on the right to
vote-and especially when that restriction falls disproportionately on
the poor, elderly and disabled-perhaps the most important question
that a court can answer is whether the particular set of voting
requirements is necessary amid the wide variety of similarly effective
procedures that exist around the nation. 68 This notion was solidified inAnderson v. Celebrezze.169
[E]ven when pursuing a legitimate interest, a State may
not choose means that unnecessarily restrict a
constitutionally protected liberty.... If the State has
open to it a less drastic way of satisfying its legitimate
interests, it may not choose a legislative scheme that
broadly stifles the exercise of fundamental personal
liberties. 7 °
Not surprisingly, since Indiana's new voter ID law is one of the
most restrictive in the country, there are other guidelines in place
throughout the country that offer some valuable guidance and
perspective. In fact, twenty-eight states and the District of Columbia,
which account for about two-thirds of the U.S. population, do not
require voters to show ID when casting their ballot.' Most of these
states follow the federal guidelines set forth in HAVA.17 1 HAVA
addresses a wide range of election issues including voting system
technology, computerization of voting lists, audit procedures, and
provisional balloting. 73 Whereas HAVA allows for multiple forms of
free and readily available ID (a current photo ID, a bank statement, a
paycheck), Indiana only allows a state or federal issued photo ID
card.' 74 Only one other state, Georgia, has ID requirements as strict as
168. See At-Tauhidi, supra note 70, at 244.
169. 460 U.S. 780 (1983).
170. Id. at 806 (quoting Kusper v. Pontikes, 414 U.S. 51, 58-59 (1973)).
171. See Overton, supra note 156, at 640.
172. 116 Stat. 1666,42 U.S.C. § 15301 et seq. (2006).
173. See At-Tauhidi, supra note 70, at 223. "HAVA's identification requirement was
designed to provide basic safeguards while simultaneously minimizing the potential for
disenfranchising voters: (1) only newly-registered, first-time voters who register by mail need
to prove their identity; (2) where documentary proof is required, it may be satisfied by
providing one of numerous forms of photo or non-photo identification; and (3) when all else
fails, voters will be allowed to cast a provisional ballot, which will be counted as long as the
voter's eligibility and registration can be subsequently verified." Id. at 223-24.
174. Crawford, 128 S. Ct. at 1635 n.26 (Souter, J., dissenting)
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Indiana's; however, in Georgia, a birth certificate is not needed to
obtain a voter ID card.
175
Then there are other states that prescribe similarly effective, yet
less restrictive means of preventing voter fraud. For instance, the state
of Florida requires photo ID, but "permits the use of several forms,
including a debit or credit card; military identification; student
identification; retirement center identification; neighborhood center
identification; and public assistance identification. 176 Florida also has
provisional ballots for those lacking the proper ID. 177 However,
instead of requiring voters to then show up at a clerk's office like
Indiana, Florida voters simply provide their signature to have their
ballots counted. 178 In fact, every other state that requires ID on
Election Day either allows many different forms of ID or allows voters
to cast a regular ballot after signing an affidavit explaining their
situation. 17
9
Lastly, it cannot be ignored that HAVA now requires each state
to develop a single, computerized, statewide voting list that may be
accessed by any election official in the state at any time. 18 States are
required to keep these computer databases current by removing the
deceased and those who lose their right to vote. These new
databases will not only be able to gather actual empirical data on the
prevalence of voter fraud, but their very existence will help deter
possible deviants from attempting to take part in voter fraud. 18
2
VI. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court has long recognized that the right to vote
demands special protection from the judiciary. 8 3 While states have a
genuine interest in administering fair elections, a photo ID requirement
can only be upheld when it does not adversely affect certain vulnerable
minorities. States should not pass arbitrarily strict election laws when
less intrusive measures are available that are equally effective in
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. 42 U.S.C. § 15483(a)(2006); see also Overton, supra note 156, at 680 (explaining
how a statewide voter registration database would lead to better election administration
practices).
181. 42 U.S.C. § 15483(a); see also Overton, supra note 156, at 680.
182. See 42 U.S.C. § 15483(a); see also Overton, supra note 156, at 680.
183. See supra Part III.A.
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eliminating voter fraud. Most importantly, courts must resist the
temptation to rely on unsubstantiated factual assumptions and instead,
must honestly weigh the costs and benefits of various types of election
regulations. Until a state can produce empirical data that clearly
justifies a restrictive photo ID requirement, courts should refuse to
uphold the use of photo ID as a legal means to screen potential voters.

